Navy’s Asiatic Fleet traces its origins back to the East India Squadron which began deploying to the Far East in the 1830s. To the best of my knowledge, they aren’t.The U.S. The Chinese Navy would have absolutely no chance against the US Navy unless all of the US admirals are complete fools. The difference in power between these two navies is massive. This is like asking “Who would win, an NFL team or an NCAA team?”. All of the US Navy’s submarines are nuclear. The Chinese have only 62 submarines of which 57 are diesel-electric. The USA also has 68 submarines, something that China can’t match in either numbers or tech level. On the other hand China only has two carriers (with one more being constructed). Of those eleven, three are in the Pacific just as a matter of course. Sure, China has 355 combat-capable vessels and the USA only has 290, but those numbers don’t tell the most important story, the fact that the US Navy operates ELEVEN aircraft carriers in total. Of course they don’t because that won’t further their narratives or agendas. If the US media thinks that an increase in Chinese defence spending is alarming, they should imagine how absolutely TERRIFYING the US military must be to other countries. So the USA spends more than $500,000,000,000 more than China EVERY SINGLE YEAR on its military. ![]() Is this question meant to be a joke? The USA spent $766,580,000,000 on its military in 2020 while China spent only $252,300,000,000. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Contributing Editor for this publication. Look to the masters of strategy for wisdom-and execute. The more PLA commanders have to worry about marine access, the more they will disperse forces along the island chain-and the less firepower they will have to concentrate at any individual flashpoint cataloged by Admiral Stavridis.Ī back-to-basics approach offers the allies their best chance of massing more combat power for a contingency than can China’s armed forces. The United States and its allies can deliberately compound China’s access dilemma by deploying along the first island chain and barring its access to the high seas through the straits that puncture the island chain. Beijing has to fret about gaining access to the Western Pacific high seas and waters beyond from the moment a warship or merchantman casts off lines in a Chinese seaport until the time it moors in a foreign port of call. Geography is a foe to China, fettering its nautical destiny. Some principles that should govern war planning in the Western Pacific or the Indian Ocean include: military and its regional allies should act on that logic, making themselves the ornerier contender rather than passively awaiting what the PLA Navy and the landbound air and rocket forces that back up the fleet choose to do off Taiwan, in the East or South China Sea, or elsewhere on the Indo-Pacific map. In part, it’s because the antagonist gets a say in how the endeavor unfolds and will do its darnedest to make sure it is stronger at the decisive place and time. In part that’s because of the climate of warfare, an endeavor rife with chance, dark passions, and Murphy’s Law. But it does bias the odds toward the better-armed gunslinger.Īnd yet Clausewitz points out that while everything in warfare is simple, accomplishing the simplest thing is difficult. More firepower furnishes no ironclad guarantee of victory. Straightforward, isn’t it? Whoever’s stronger where it matters, when it matters, wins. Strategic grandmasters from Carl von Clausewitz to Alfred Thayer Mahan affirm that at its most fundamental, strategy is about amassing more firepower than the adversary at the scene of battle at the time of battle. commanders and officialdom should look to the basics of strategy, concentrating in particular on the principle of concentration. ![]() ![]() and allied strategy vis-à-vis China for times of strife. They are the Taiwan Strait Japan and the East China Sea the South China Sea and more distant waters around China’s other neighbors, including Indonesia, Singapore, Australia and India.” “I see four distinct maritime ‘flashpoint’ zones, where the Chinese navy may potentially take military action against the U.S. China’s PLAN: Who Wins a War At Sea? A few months back over at Bloomberg retired Admiral Jim Stavridis presents his take on the growth of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy and projects how a maritime war might play out:
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